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Independent Adoptions: Is the Black and White
Beginning to Appear in the Controversy
Over Gray-Market Adoptions?
I. INTRODUCTION
A child is born to parents who will not, may not, or cannot care for
their baby; a young couple wants to begin a family, but cannot con-
ceive their own child because nature's delicate and intricate reproduc-
tive system is not functioning properly. By uniting the homeless baby
with the babiless home, the American adoption system can provide
that which happenstance and nature did not.
When a person or a couple desires to adopt a child in the United
States,' there are several vehicles ' through which a child can be ob-
tained.' The most extensively used is the adoption agency, which can
be either a public agency-an arm of the government-or a private
agency'-a nonprofit entity. Both types of agencies are heavily con-
trolled through various state laws, rules, and regulations., In contrast
to placement through controlled agencies is placement through
unlicensed groups and individuals.6 This unlicensed placement activity,
1. Typically the concern is with infants less than one year old since these children
are in greatest demand. It should be noted that it can take up to five years to adopt a
child through an agency. W. MEEZAN, S. KATZ, & E. Russo, ADOPTIONS WITHOUT AGENCIES:
A STUDY OF INDEPENDENT ADOPTIONS 36 (1978) [hereinafter cited as ADOPTIONS WITHOUT
AGENCIES].
2. The vehicles perform several functions, the most important of which is finding a
child. After the child is found this entity functions as a conduit for the flow of money,
documents, and eventually the baby. See generally Innocents, Inc., STUDENT LAW.,
December, 1977, at 23.
3. The adoption itself will not occur until sometime after the placement. For exam-
ple, in Pennsylvania the adoptive parents must, within thirty days after the date of
receipt of the child, submit a Report of Intention to Adopt, be investigated as to their
suitability to be parents, and eventually petition the court for the adoption itself. PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 1, §§ 331-401 (Purdon Supp. 1978).
4. Typical private agencies that one may find in Western Pennsylvania include:
Family and Children's Service, a United Way Agency; Lutheran Social Services; Catholic
Social Service; Catholic Charities; and the Children's Home of Pittsburgh.
5. For example, in Pennsylvania these agencies are supervised by the Pennsylvania
Department of Public Welfare. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 102(2) (Purdon Supp. 1978). Accor-
ding to Pennsylvania's definition, " '[algency' means any incorporated or unincorporated
organization, society, institution, or other entity, public or voluntary . . . supervised by
the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare and providing adoption services in accor-
dance with standards established by the department." Id.
6. Typically these people are doctors, attorneys, social workers, or other concerned
professionals. Article, Black-Market Adoptions, 11 CATH. LAW. 48, 54 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as Black-Market Adoptions]; Comment, Moppets on the Market. The Problem of
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known alternatively as the gray market,7 private placement," or in-
dependent adoption,9 has been increasingly scrutinized by legislative
bodies." Prompting this scrutiny is the substantial concern that
unlicensed placement permits black-market trafficking in the lives of
infants, and consequently, the making of illegal profits at the expense
of a child's welfare."
. To halt the baby black market, state legislatures have suggested
varying remedial approaches."2 Most states seek to prevent private
placement from operating as a black-market venture by imposing cer-
tain control measures including, inter alia, limitations on non-agency
placements, limitations and criminal sanctions on profit making, and re-
quirements for reporting the facts surrounding the placement." A few
states and the District of Columbia, however, have taken a more
severe stance and have completely outlawed all private adoptions."
Unregulated Adoptions, 59 YALE L.J. 715, 715 n.2 (1950). See also ADOPTIONS WITHOUT
AGENCIES, supra note 1, at 1, 52 which states that it is primarily doctors (37%) and
lawyers (53%) who place children privately.
7. The term "gray market" was probably coined by proponents of agency adoptions
since it suggests that serious problems can exist even though the practice is legal. See
Grove, Independent Adoption: The Case for the Gray Market, 13 VILL. L. REV. 116,
117-118 (1967) [hereinafter cited as The Case for the Gray Market].
8. In a sense, "private placement" is a misnomer since most adoption agencies are
also private institutions. This phrase, however, has come to mean that no agency or in-
stitution was involved in the placement and is synonymous with the term "independent
adoption." Id at 117.
9. The term "independent adoption" signifies the fact that no licensed agency is in-
volved in placing the child. Id.
10. As part of the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment and Adoption Reform Act
of 1978, Congress directed the Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare to study placements by persons or agencies which are not licensed or regulated
by any governmental unit. 42 U.S.C. § 5114 (Supp. 11 1978).
11. The basic problem is that greed for a profit replaces considerations for the
welfare of the child. The Case for the Gray Market, supra note 7, at 118-19.
12. Throughout this comment there will be an underlying theme emphasizing the
uniformity of state adoption laws. It is believed that this uniformity is necessary not only
to insure that each state has "good" laws, but moreover to insure that there are no states
which have significantly weaker adoption laws and thereby become "adoption havens." Id.
at 126-29. These "adoption havens" would not only facilitate black-market adoptions but
would also provide a shortcut around the stricter laws of other jurisdictions, which are
designed to protect the best interest of a child in any placement.
13. For a discussion of typical statutory devices see Black-Market Adoptions, supra
note 6, at 56-61.
14. These jurisdictions are: Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-63 (West Supp.
1979); Delaware, DELA. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 904 (Michie 1974); District of Columbia, D.C.
CODE § 32-785 (1973); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 74-418 (Supp. 1979); Massachusetts, MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 28A, § 11 (West Supp. 1979); and New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 22-2-37 (Supp. 1975). But note that Connecticut permits the requirement for an agency
placement to be waived by an Adoption Review Board after a hearing, if it is in the best
interest of the child. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-69d (West Supp. 1979). Similarly, Mifi-
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Since the important interest at stake is the welfare of an infant, each
state theoretically attempts to design stringent adoption laws and to
provide strict enforcement of those laws; yet, the possibility always ex-
ists that a disparity in degrees of stringency imposed by the adoption
laws will exist among the states. Testimony before the United States
Senate has revealed that most black-market placements involve at
least one state with comparatively weak adoption laws and procedures.
Regardless, then, of how stringent a state's adoption law may be,
without national uniformity, the parties can easily undermine and cir-
cumvent it by merely crossing the state line and taking advantage of
the more liberal law in a neighboring jurisdiction. 5
A possible solution to this dilemma is comprehensive, uniform adop-
tion legislation which particulary addresses the unlicensed placement
problem; but, to date, most legislative efforts have not met with accep-
tance." Presently, another attempt at model legislation is well under-
way," and the purpose of this comment is to focus upon one issue that
the model act will address: namely, whether the gray market should be
permitted to continue.
Initially, this comment will discuss in general the formulation of the
new model legislation. Thereafter, the major arguments condemning
the legal existence of private placements will be analyzed, and
arguments in favor of the gray market will also be examined to il-
lustrate the prevailing interests which should be considered before the
decision to outlaw or regulate the gray market is finally determined.
The conclusion will summarize the recommendations made throughout
nesota, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.22, subd. 2(e) (West Supp. 1979), and New Mexico, N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 22-2-37 E (Supp. 1975), allow the court to waive the agency placement re-
quirement if it is in the best interest of the child or the persons petitioning for the adop-
tion.
15. S. REP. No. 167, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 26-27, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 557, 571-72 [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 1671; Black-Market Adoptions,
supra note 6, at 64-68. In Minnesota, for example, the strict law can be avoided by the
adoptive family setting up "residency" in another state, having a child placed with them
in accordance with a neighboring state's more liberal placement provisions, and "moving"
back to Minnesota. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.22, subd. 2(d) (West Supp. 1979). Although
it appears that no state has completely definitive adoption legislation, as will be discuss-
ed, many individual states do have one or more statutory sections that are worthy of in-
clusion in a comprehensive statute. The study Adoptions Without Agencies indicated that
almost one-quarter of the children independently adopted were born in other states. Fur-
thermore, the study revealed that more than one-fourth of the attorneys interviewed
stated that at least half of the adoptions they facilitated were interstate. ADOPTIONS
WITHOUT AGENCIES, supra note 1, at 49, 121-22.
16. See S. REP. No. 167, supra note 15, at 18-20.
17. The Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment and Adoption Reform Act of 1978
provides for a panel to draft model adoption legislation and procedures. 42 U.S.C. §
5112(a) (Supp. II 1978).
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the comment and will include a brief synopsis of the suggested solu-
tions offered by the new model adoption legislation" to eliminate prob-
lems in gray-market adoptions.
II. FEDERAL MODEL ADOPTION LEGISLATION AND PROCEDURES
To facilitate adoption1 within the United States, Congress passed
Title II of the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment and Adoption
Reform Act of 1978 (Adoption Reform Act).' Although the emphasis of
the act is on special need children,21 the underlying purpose is to pro-
pose broad model legislation and procedures' which would eliminate
"jurisdictional and legal" obstacles to adoption.'
The proposed model legislation is the responsibility of a panel ap-
pointed by the Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare (HEW).2' Composed of seventeen members, representing public
and voluntary organizations, agencies, and interested persons with ex-
pertise and experience in the adoption area," the panel will specifically
address the issue of gray-market adoptions. Accordingly, Title II of the
Adoption Reform Act provides for an HEW-sponsored study of in-
dependent adoptions." The focus of the study is on the nature, scope,
18. 45 Fed. Reg. 10,621 (1980).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 5111 (Supp. II 1978). The act reads in pertinent part: "It is, therefore,
the purpose of this subchapter to facilitate the elimination of barriers to adoption and to
provide permanent and loving home environments for children who would benefit by
adoption .... Id.
20. Id. §§ 5111-5115.
21. Id § 5111. Special need children include older, school-aged children who also may
be mentally or physically handicapped. Id. It was estimated that the federal government
annually spends $700 million for the foster care of approximately 350,000 children of
whom up to one-third are these special need children. S. REP. No. 167, supra note 15, at
17.
22. 42 U.S.C. § 5112(a) (Supp. II 1978). However broad this proposed legislation may
appear to be, Congress limited it by requiring that it not conflict with provisions of any
interstate compact. Id,
23. See S. REP. No. 167, supra note 15, at 17-18, for a listing of the impediments envi-
sioned by Congress.
24. The panel actually recommended the model legislation to the Secretary of HEW
who had the final word on what was published in the Federal Register for public com-
ment. 42 U.S.C. § 5112(a) (Supp. 11 1978).
25. The Act allowed between eleven and seventeen members on the panel. Id §
5112(b)(1). A list and short introduction of the panel members can be obtained from Ms.
Diane D. Broadhurst, Executive Director, Model Adoption Legislation and Procedures Ad-
visory Panel, Children's Bureau of HEW.
26. The study was well underway when the legislation was passed and is now
published as ADOPTIONS WITHOUT AGENCIES, note 1 supra, Telephone conversation with
Ms. Diane D. Broadhurst, Executive Secretary, Model Adoption Legislation and Pro-
cedures Advisory Panel, on August 9, 1979.
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and effect of child placement by unlicensed or unregulated persons or
groups. Although the study includes both interstate and intrastate
adoptions, it excludes children placed in the homes of the child's step-
parents or relatives.'
As an adjunct to the proposed model legislation, Title II of the
Adoption Reform Act requires the initiation within HEW of a central
organization to plan and coordinate all HEW activities affecting adop-
tion. Moreover, this organization will maintain a national adoption and
foster care data system, conduct an education and training program on
adoption, provide technical assistance in carrying out adoption pro-
grams, and consult with other appropriate federal departments.
28
By providing for model legislation, an unlicensed adoption study and
information services, the Adoption Reform Act not only highlights the
existing evils in the adoption process for the states, but also offers
viable solutions for overcoming those evils. To motivate the states
toward considering these possible statutory solutions, the Adoption
Reform Act grants HEW the power to take whatever steps are
deemed necessary." Yet, what exact form this persuasion will take re-
mains to be seen. The proposed model legislation was published in the
Federal Register on February 15, 1980."'
III. ARGUMENTS QUESTIONING THE PROPRIETY OF
INDEPENDENT ADOPTIONS
A. Independent Adoption Does Not Insure That the Best
Interest of the Child Will Be Met
The argument that the independent adoption does not insure the
furtherance of a child's best interest is usually the first raised, and the
one raised most often.8 Essentially, the steps in an independent adop-
tion are as follows: a child is placed in a home by a person or persons
other than a regulated agency, the adoptive parents petition for adop-
tion, an investigation to ascertain the child's adjustment to the new
family and the suitability of the family itself is conducted, and finally,
the adoption hearing is held and the petition is either denied or
granted. 2 When an agency places the child, the only significant
change' in the sequence of events is that the agency will investigate
27. 42 U.S.C. § 5114 (Supp. II 1978).
28. Id. § 5113.
29. Id. § 5112(c).
30. Id § 5112(a).
31. The Case for the Gray Market supra note 7, at 121-23. See Black-Market Adop-
tions, supra note 6, at 52-54.
32. E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, §§ 331-508 (Purdon Supp. 1978).
33. This is at least the most significant change as to the sequence of events leading
to the adoption. An alteration in the timing within the scenario occurs if an agency does
1980
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the prospective parents before they can receive a child.14 The absence
of this preplacement evaluation of the adoptive parents and their home
is what the opponents of independent adoption emphasize when they
say that the best interest of the child will not be met. If it is true that
a placement assessment will separate the "good" parents from the
"bad" parents, then the argument against independent adoptions
seems quite logical.
There have been statistical studies comparing adoptions arranged
by agencies with adoptions arranged by unlicensed intermediaries. The
results of a rather small 1949 study, conducted by the Yale Child
Development Clinic, indicated that the agency method of preplacement
evaluation did serve to promote the best interest of a child and was
better than taking no preplacement action whatsoever. This study com-
pared one hundred independent adoptions to one hundred agency adop-
tions in Connecticut. 5 While seventy-six percent of the agency
placements were rated as satisfactory, only forty-six percent of the
private placements were given this rating. Moreover, the study re-
vealed that only eight percent of the agency placements were found
definitely undesirable" as compared with twenty-eight percent for
private placements.36
The implicit conclusion, however, of a much larger study by Witmer,
Herzog, Weinstein, and Sullivan in 1963, comparing Florida private
placements with a control group of children living with their natural
parents, 7 was that there is no significant difference in the number of
unsatisfactory placements in instances where the children are placed
either through agencies or private channels. According to this survey,
only between twenty and twenty-five percent of the private
placements were definitely unsatisfactory. Because other comparable
studies in the area had marked the agency failure rate between ten
the placement. Most agencies will not place a child until all the rights of the child's
natural parents have been released or legally terminated, and until the end of the period
in which the release could be revoked. See ADOPTIONS WITHOUT AGENCIES, supra note 1, at
87-89; notes 85-92 and accompanying text infra.
34. ADOPTIONS WITHOUT AGENCIES, supra note 1, at 26-27. For a 1977 summary of
state laws in the area of social study provisions see id at 173-82.
35. Yale Child Development Clinic, Report on Current Adoption Practice in Connec-
ticut - Independent & Agency Placement (mimeographed in 1949, a summary of which
may be found in The Case for the Gray Market, supra note 7, at 122.).
36. Id For another unpublished study showing that agency placements are better,
see Podolski, Abolishing Baby Buying: Limiting Independent Adoption Placement, 9 FAM.
L.Q. 547, 548 n.2 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Abolishing Baby Buying]. See also ADOPTIONS
WITHOUT AGENCIES, supra note 1, at 3-4.
37. H. WITMER, E. HERZOG, E. WEINSTEIN & M. SULLIVAN, INDEPENDENT ADOPTIONS
(1963) (a summary of which may be found in The Case for the Gray Market, supra note 7,
at 123-25.).
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and twenty-five percent, the 1963 study concluded that there was lit-
tle, if any, disparity in the failure rates of private or agency adoptions,
and correspondingly, in their success rates. That a failure rate in fact
exists was attributed to the imperfection of any system and the ap-
pearance of certain factors which cause an unsatisfactory placement
only after the finalization of the adoption."
The most recent analysis of private adoptions, which was sponsored
by the Child Welfare League of America and was supported by federal
monies, 9 spanned the years from 1975 to 1978. It was national in scope
and focused upon the actual conditions under which independent adop-
tions are carried out, as experienced by biological parents, adoptive
parents, agencies, intermediaries, and law enforcement agents.'" Since
the responding agencies considered a high proportion of independent
homes as good or better than agency homes,'1 there was a significant
lack of data proving the inferiority of independent adoptions. This
prompted the study to conclude that it is too early to outlaw complete-
ly the independent adoption alternative. 2
This empirical data thus reveals that condemnation of independent
adoptions on the grounds that the best interest of the child will not be
met has not been conclusively proven. Moreover, adequate legislative
controls would all but eliminate the argument. To reiterate, the basis
of the argument is that one needs a preplacement evaluation to insure
that the best interest of the child Will be met. The validity of the argu-
ment, then, becomes dependent upon the state laws governing indepen-
dent placement procedures. For example, if state law required that an
investigation be done in a private placement before or shortly after
the child is placed,'3 and if the investigation were comparable to that
normally performed in an agency adoption," the argument is practical-
38. Id. For another unpublished study showing that private placements are as
satisfactory as agency placements, see Abolishing Baby Buying, supra note 36, at 548 n.2.
39. See notes 19-30 and accompanying text supra.
40. Reid, Forward to ADOPTIONS WITHOUT AGENCIES, supra note 1, at iii.
41. ADOPTIONS WITHOUT AGENCIES, supra note 1, at 42.
42. Id at 3, 232.
43. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.092(1) (West Supp. 1979). The Florida statute in perti-
nent part reads: "The intermediary [at least 30 days prior to placement] shall report any
intended placement of a minor for adoption with any person not related within the third
degree or a stepparent if the intermediary has knowledge of, or participates in, such in-
tention to place." Id. (emphasis added). Of course one may attempt to circumvent the
statute by arguing that a placement is being made into a foster home with no present in-
tent by the foster parents to adopt. The Florida statute further requires that the study be
completed "within 30 days or by the intended placement date, whichever is later." Id §
63.092(2). See generally Black-Market Adoptions, supra note 6, at 56-59.
44. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45-63 (West Supp. 1979), which requires that the
preadoption investigation be done by the commissioner of the department of children and
1980
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ly nullified. Interestingly, adoption agencies are often involved in
private placements as the court-appointed investigator pursuant to
state law." But under most existing statutory schemes, the timing for
their involvement is long after placement, and the scope of their in-
vestigation is severly limited since a state usually requires a much less
extensive report than the agency would require of itself, if it were the
actual party responsible for placing the child." But because the agency
approach to "finding a good home" can be simulated through com-
prehensive legislative enactments, any state can assure the effective
evaluation of prospective adoptive parents before the child has spent
much time in the home.
7
B. Independent Adoption Insures the Black Market's Continued
Existence
That the independent adoption process insures the continued ex-
istence of the black market is the other major argument and the one
receiving the greatest public attention in the debate over the proprie-
ty of independent adoptions." Since independent adoptions are viewed
as the major factor encouraging black-market operations, the pro-
ponents of this argument would completely eliminate private place-
ment and would require that all adoptions be handled by nonprofit 9
regulated agencies. Nonetheless, it seems a very drastic step to
eradicate a system, albeit an informal one, which yearly places about
youth services or a child-placing agency. Note, however, that most states are more liberal
concerning the status of the investigating party.
45. E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 335 (Purdon Supp. 1978). According to the Penn-
sylvania statute: "[T]he court shall cause an investigation to be made by one of the follow-
ing: a local public child care agency .... a voluntary child care agency, or an appropriate
person designated by the court." I&
46. The study Adoptions Without Agencies concluded that under most existing laws
the independent adoptive home is evaluated on different criteria than homes approved for
agency adoptions. The studies of private placements performed by the agencies pursuant
to state law are termed by the agencies themselves as "cursory" at best. ADOPTIONS
WITHOUT AGENCIES, supra note 1, at 26-27, 93.
47. The concern is that the child may develop psychological ties to the home in which
he is placed, only to have them destroyed by a later decision that the home is unsatisfac-
tory. Black-Market Adoptions, supra note 6, at 57 n.44. But, most of the agencies ques-
tioned in Adoptions Without Agencies stated that there was a reluctance by the court to
remove a child from a home once he is placed. More than half of the agencies responded
that even when negative recommendations are made, the adoption is usually approved.
ADOPTIONS WITHOUT AGENCIES, supra note 1, at 26-27.
48. See generally ADOPTIONS WITHOUT AGENCIES, supra note 1, at 7-9, 28; The Case
for the Gray Market, supra note 7, at 117-21; Black-Market Adoptions, supra note 6, at
48-54; Innocents, Inc., STUDENT LAW., December, 1977, at 12.
49. See note 14 supra for those states that have followed this logic.
50. ADOPTIONS WITHOUT AGENCIES, supra note 1, at 10.
Vo1.18:629
Independent Adoptions
twenty-one percent of the children for adoption in the United States.5 '
Moreover, recent studies have proven that the bulk of private
placements are not black-market placements.52 As a parenthetical con-
sideration, it might be noted that eliminating the private placement
alternative to halt illegal placement may actually have the opposite
practical effect: because the demand for adoptable children would be
running even further ahead of the regulated agencies' ability to place
children, black-market activity would be heightened. In light of these
factors, it appears that a more appropriate attack on the black market
could be mounted through effective statutory controls.
Several states have, in fact, enacted statutory restraints directed at
halting the black market.' The first control measure, which seems as
drastic as completely outlawing private placements, is limiting the per-
sons who can privately place. Often, only the natural parents, relatives,
or guardians can place, unless the child is being placed with a brother,
'sister, aunt, uncle, grandparent, natural father or step-parent of such
child.' Although this control appears simple enough, it is easily cir-
cumvented. With a small amount of participation by the mother, for ex-
ample, physically handing the baby to the lawyer who is truly acting
as the intermediary, the otherwise illegal placement is legitimized.55
A second control measure is to impose criminal penalties for making
51. The study Adoptions Without Agencies showed that of the 131 adoptions exam-
ined in the study only thirteen percent of the cases could be classified as legally ques-
tionable. Interestingly, the lawyer intermediary was the intermediary most likely to be in-
volved in a legally questionable adoption. Twenty-two percent of lawyer arranged adop-
tions were considered legally questionable, compared with only four percent of the adop-
tions arranged by other professionals. The highest estimate cited in the study was that
one-third of the 1971 independent adoptions may have been of the black-market type.
ADOPTIONS WITHOUT AGENCIES, supra note 1, at 9, 74-77.
52. Black-Market Adoptions, supra note 6, at 52, 60-61.
53. See id. at 56-61.
54. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-39 (West Supp. 1980), which states that:
a. No person, firm, partnership, corporation, association or agency shall place,
offer to place or materially assist in the placement of any child for adoption in New
Jersey unless such person shall be the parent or guardian of the child, or such firm,
partnership, corporation, association or agency shall be an approved agency; pro-
vided, however, that this prohibition shall not apply to the placement for adoption
of a child with a brother, sister, aunt, uncle, grandparent, natural father or step-
parent of such child.
Id. (emphasis added). A corporation convicted of the crime, a misdemeanor, could be fined
up to $7,500 and an individual first offender could be likewise fined, or imprisoned be-
tween three and five years. Id. §§ 2C:43-2 to -6.
55. The Case for the Gray Market supra note 7, at 126 (cited in Black-Market Adop-
tions, supra note 6, at 58 n.54.). See ADOPTIONS WITHOUT AGENCIES, supra note 1, at
165-66. See also notes 74-76 and accompanying text infra for discussion of a case where
the state attempted to enforce these controls.
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a profit on child placement." However, when a professional like an at-
torney or a doctor becomes involved, it is difficult to determine
whether the profit is being made from professional services or place-
ment services." One attempt at solving this problem has been to limit
the amount of any fee paid to an intermediary to $500, exclusive of
documented medical, court, and hospital costs, unless the court ap-
proves a higher amount.58 Usually coupled with limitation of the fee is
the requirement to disclose to the court the monies which changed
hands before or after placement. 9 Of course, the success of this type of
control, like the rest, depends upon strict compliance by the parties,
and the subterfuge of a reasonable professional fee paid by check and
disclosed, followed by a much larger placement fee in cash and held in
confidence, can easily occur. Moreover, it appears that the adopting
parents are not only willing to pay heavily for a child but will also per-
jure themselves as to the amount paid.0
56. E.g, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-54 (West Supp. 1980) which states that:
a. No person, firm, partnership, corporation, association or agency shall make,
offer to make or assist or participate in any placement for adoption and in connec-
tion therewith (1) Pay, give or agree to give any money or any valuable considera-
tion, or assume or discharge any financial obligation; or (2) Take, receive, accept or
agree to accept any money or any valuable consideration.
b. The prohibition of subsection a. shall not apply to the fees or services of any
approved agency in connection with a placement for adoption, nor shall such pro-
hibition apply to the payment or reimbursement of medical, hospital or other
similar expenses incurred in connection with the birth or any illness of the child, or
to the acceptance of such reimbursement by a parent of the child.
c. Any person, firm, partnership, corporation, association or agency violating
this section shall be guilty of a high misdemeanor.
Id. A corporation convicted of this crime could be fined up to $7,500 and an individual
first offender could be likewise fined, or imprisoned between three and five years. Id. §§
2C:43-2 to -6. For a New Jersey case upholding the constitutionality of the above words
contained in a predecessor section, see State v. Wasserman, 75 N.J. Super. 480, 183 A.2d
467 (App. Div. 1962), aff'd per curiam, 39 N.J. 516, 189 A.2d 218 (1963).
57. ADOPTIONS WITHOUT AGENCIES, supra note 1, at 182-85; The Case for the Gray
Market supra note 7, at 126-27.
58. For example, Florida law provides that "[any fee ...over $500 paid to an in-
termediary other than actual, documented medical costs, court costs, and hospital costs
must be approved by the court prior to payment to the intermediary." FLA. STAT. ANN. §
63.097 (West Supp. 1979).
59. E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 331 (Purdon Supp. 1978). The statute requires that
the report of intention to adopt contain "the circumstances surrounding the persons
receiving or retaining possession, custody or control of the child; .... [and] the fee or ex-
penses paid or to be paid to the intermediary .... Id. In one recent case the total fee
paid by the attorneys was $3,500 for a baby boy born in Arizona and placed in New
Jersey. In re Adoption of Child by I.T. and K.T., 164 N.J. Super. 476, 397 A.2d 341 (App.
Div. 1978). More specifically, a New Jersey County Court Judge found that $2,000 of the
$3,000 paid to a Chilean attorney was actually a broker's or finder's fee. In re Adoption of
Child by N.P. and F.P., 165 N.J. Super. 591, 398 A.2d 937 (Union County Ct. 1979).
60. ADOPTIONS WITHOUT AGENCIES, supra note 1, at 28,182-98; Black-MarketAdoptions,
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The last control measure, which appears to be one of the most effec-
tive methods of stopping black-market activity, is to require reports at
various stages of the placement and the adoption."1 These reports not
only allow the state to undertake studies of the child and potential
adoptive home as previously discussed, 2 but also give the independent
adoption visibility. Once the state becomes aware of the private place-
ment, it can then be scrutinized for breach of statutory requirements.
There are many variations on the theme of reporting, encompassing
both the timing and the substance of the report." Some states merely
require notice, which must be given before the child is even placed."
Others require a more detailed report"5 which, in most instances, oc-
curs after placement.
The existing statutory scheme has as many variations as there are
state capitals. As yet, no single state has developed a sufficiently
sophisticated, comprehensive statutory scheme regulating private
adoptions which effectively ensures the halting of black-market ac-
tivities; although several states have one or more good ideas in their
statutory provisions, each state still seems incapable of providing the
lower threshold of assurance that placement for profit, will not occur
within its borders. And even if the majority of states did possess strin-
gent laws controlling private placements, the few remaining states
with weaker, unsatisfactory controls could function as interstate con-
duits for the black market. If, however, controls were properly and
uniformly adopted across the nation, the perversion" of private
placements into black-market profiteering would not occur. Therefore,
until every state entertains uniform, or at least, a substantially similar
modicum of preventative statutory controls, the black market may un-
fortunately prosper.
But even with strict uniform state controls, the black market can
still prosper unless these controls are enforced. The present sanctions
are criminal in nature and are independent of the adoption process
supra note 6, at 59. Another ingenious way to subvert all the controls as well as the adop-
tion mechanism is to have the natural mother enter the hospital under the name of the
adoptive mother and have a fictitious birth certificate prepared or just alter an existing
birth certificate. ADOPTIONS WITHOUT AGENCIES, supra note 1, at 164, 233.
61. Black-Market Adoptions, supra note 6, at 57-59.
62. Discussed in notes 31-47 and accompanying text supra.
63. ADOPTIONS WITHOUT AGENCIES, supra note 1, at 169-82. For a 1977 analysis of
state adoption statutes including notification requirements see id. at 171-72.
64. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.470(4) (Baldwin 1974).
65. E.g., note 59 supra.
66. ADOPTIONS WITHOUT AGENCIES, supra note 1, at 169-73; Black-Market Adoptions,
supra note 6, at 57-59.
67. Black-Market Adoptions, supra note 6, at 52, 60-61.
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itself. 8 At the outset it should be recognized that if a child is obtained
"illegally" it does not mean that the adoptive couple will be prevented
from legally adopting the child at a later date. In determining whether
the child may remain with the original adoptive couple, the court con-
siders the best interest of the child, regardless of what laws any party
to the adoption may have broken."
Commentators"0 and welfare agencies7' have questioned whether
there is much enforcement of the existing restrictions. The answer to
this question was perhaps starkly revealed when the Child Welfare
League of America almost totally failed to obtain data in a recent
survey on the enforcement of adoption laws. Only twenty-five percent
of the questionnaires were completed by the attorneys general or
district attorneys solicited. Nonetheless, the study did draw a conclu-
sion from this non-response: that there was a "probable lack of interest
or knowledge" in the area of black-market adoptions. From the little
data received it was further concluded that there are minimal reports
of violations" and almost no monitoring of adoptive placement prac-
tices by law enforcement officials. 3 To preclude enforcement from be-
ing the weak link in independent adoption control, Title II of Adoption
Reform Act has provided for national data collection, education, and
training, which may aid law enforcement officials in acquiring an
awareness or sensitivity to child placement abuses.
Even assuming that increased sensitivity to the problems associated
with black-market adoptions will result in increased effort on the part
of public officials to enforce existing restrictions, there is no guarantee
68. See ADOPTIONS WITHOUT AGENCIES, supra note 1, at 185-88. For a state by state
listing of penalties as of 1977 see id. at 188-98.
69. In re Adoption of Child by I.T. and K.T., 164 N.J. Super. 476, 397 A.2d 341 (App.
Div. 1978). The appellate court reversed the trial court's rejection of the adoption com-
plaint. The sole ground for the trial court's rejection had been the adoptive parents' par-
ticipation in an illegal placement of the child. The best interest of the child was empha-
sized by the appellate court as being the correct test for whether the child may be
adopted. The appellate court saw "[tihe enforcement of the criminal law [as] a matter
separate and apart from the function of an adoption proceeding, and the deterrence of
possible criminal sanctions must suffice as the sole remedy chosen by the Legislature." Id.
at 486, 397 A.2d at 345. Finally, the appellate court stated that the public policy underly-
ing the adoption system is to "maintain an existing relationship in a stable home." Id. at
488, 397 A.2d at 346. See Black-Market Adoptions, supra note 6, at 59-60.
70. E.g., Black-Market Adoptions, supra note 6, at 59-60 nn.57-59.
71. The responding agencies in a recent survey cited lack of enforcement as one of
the reasons for the continued success of black-market operations. ADOPTIONS WITHOUT
AGENCIES, supra note 1, at 42.
72. This conclusion should not be too surprising since there is really no one directly
involved in a black-market transaction who would be likely to complain. Black-Market
Adoptions, supra note 6, at 59-60.
73. ADOPTIONS WITHOUT AGENCIES, supra note 1, at 211-18.
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that the statutory restrictions will be applied by a court once a
criminal proceeding is brought. Some courts have demonstrated a
reluctance to impose criminal penalties when an intermediary is acting
in the best interest of the child, even though the applicable statutory
language would preclude this involvement. For example, in Galison v.
District of Columbia,7 the conviction of one attorney under the
District's Baby Broker Act was affirmed, but the conviction of another
attorney was reversed even though the second attorney's conduct
clearly fell within the prohibitions of the Act, which limited the parties
who could place a child to parents, relatives, or licensed child-placing
agencies." The Act was deemed inapplicable to the second attorney's
conduct, for the court found that the District of Columbia had no con-
tact or nexus with the adoptions arranged by that attorney within the
District. The court reasoned that although the attorney practiced in
the District of Columbia and the babies were born to nonresident
mothers in District hospitals, the District had no interest in applying
its law, since the natural mothers involved in this instance were not
coerced into putting their children up for adoption, as was the situa-
tion leading to the conviction of the first attorney. Because the
resulting Virginia and Maryland adoptions of these children born to
Maryland residents were lawful and because the Maryland residents'
presence merely for medical care in the District was fortuitous, the
court believed that the attorney intermediary should not be exposed to
criminal liability under the District's Baby Broker Act." Thus, the
court purposefully used the diverse citizenship of the parties involved
to avoid the application of the statute.
The Galison decision exemplifies the competing interests at stake in
connection with the enforcement of statutory restrictions upon private
adoptions. On the one hand, the refusal of the District of Columbia
court to apply the Baby Broker Act would appear to be reasonable in a
case in which there was no coercive element, nor any other factor
which would be offensive to the District's interest in regulating
private adoptions. On the other hand, the rationale employed by the
Galison court for not applying the Act, based upon the residence of the
natural and adoptive parents, is troubling in that it may render the
statute ineffective in situations which clearly fall within the ambit of
74. 402 A.2d 1263 (D.C. 1979).
75. Id at 1269, 1271. The Baby Broker Act provides:
No person other than the parent, guardian, or relative within the third degree,
and no firm, corporation, association, or agency, other than a licensed child-placing
agency, may place or arrange or assist in placing or arranging for the placement of
a child under sixteen years of age in a family home or for adoption.
D.C. CODE § 32-785 (1973).
76. Id at 1271.
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legitimate governmental concern over the well-being of the parties in-
volved in a private adoption proceeding. In any event, Galison
demonstrates that the enactment of strong regulatory legislation is
only a first step in solving the problems associated with black-market
adoptions.
C. Independent Adoption Does Not Insure That the Best Interest
of the Natural Parents Will Be Met
Historically, when considering whether the independent adoption
process insured that the best interests of the natural parents would be
met, the main concern had been for the biological mother and her
needs. But, since the United States Supreme Court decisions of
Stanley v. Illinois," and more recently, Caban v. Mohammed,"5 there
has been an increasing focus on the biological father, his parental
rights, and corresponding needs when confronted with the question of
whether or not he will allow his offspring to be adopted. Basically, the
interests of the biological father and biological mother are the same,
and for the purposes of this discussion, the best interest of the natural
parents will be considered from the perspective of the biological
mother.
One major concern is the absence of counseling in an independent
adoption for the biological mother. Studies have shown that in one-
third of the cases, the needs and rights of the biological mother were
subrogated to either the desires of her parents or the desires of the in-
termediary, who, of course, primarily represents the adoptive couple.
Because of the biased and emotional involvement of these two parties,
it has been suggested that the biological mother needs an independent
party with whom she can discuss her options and problems."9
Determining the outcome in a situation where the infant is born
with physical or developmental problems and the original designated
home will not accept the child is another important consideration left
unanswered in independent adoptions. In an agency adoption, that
same agency usually provides specialized services for these children in
need, and thus, the agency will be present to assist the natural mother.
But in a private adoption there are no such safeguards, and the mother
will be left with an unwanted child and few viable options: she may
77. 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (it is a violation of due process guarantees to presume without
a hearing that unmarried fathers are unsuitable parents for custody purposes).
78. 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (it is unconstitutional discrimination to require the biological
mother's consent to adoption and not the biological father's consent when the father is
known and has manifested a paternal interest).
79. ADOPTIONS WITHOUT AGENCIES, supra note 1, at 105-06, 116-18.
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reluctantly keep the child; be forced to find another, perhaps less
suitable, home; or eventually turn to a child care agency."
The economic factors influencing a private adoption are also of
great concern. Biological mothers often receive financial assistance
from the adoptive parents for medical, housing, legal, and incidental
expenses. Usually, this assistance is qualitatively and quantitatively
better than that available from the agencies. The natural mother's
receipt of this financial benefit can, however, become a detriment
should the intermediary use it as leverage to prevent the natural
mother from recanting the decision to put her baby up for adoption;
realizing the ominous burden that repayment of these monies would
present, the natural mother is not as free to consider the revocation of
her voluntary relinquishment of parental rights."1
A final risk shared by both the biological mother and the baby is
that the person or persons in whose home the child is placed may not
legally adopt the child. This incompletion of the adoption process, leav-
ing the child "in a state of limbo," may occur for many reasons: for ex-
ample, the parents may be afraid of petitioning for the adoption
because they suspect that a negative report may have been made by
the court-appointed investigator, or the parents may not seek the
adoption because they had paid an illegal fee for the child and they are
afraid that the court might, upon consideration of the petition, remove
the child.2 The adoption agency, by contrast, will follow through in its
involvement with the child and his new home to insure that the new
adoption is finally completed.
3
However, such problems could be cured by statutorily guaranteeing
the availability of qualified personnel who would offer both counseling
to the biological parents and immediate alternative planning should the
prospective adoptive couple find the child unacceptable because of a
physical or developmental birth defect. Moreover, to prevent any
placed child from living in a state of legal limbo, the legislature could
mandate that an adoption petition be filed within one year of the place-
ment date or that the parties file with the court the reasons that an
adoption is not being pursued.
D. Independent Adoption Does Not Insure That the Best Interest
of the Adoptive Parents Will Be Met
Although the following issues are categorized as primarily affecting
the interests of the adoptive parents, many of them necessarily impact
80. Id. at 103-04, 118.
81. Id. at 102-03, 118-19.
82. Id. at 33.
83. Id. at 32-33, 222-23.
84. Id. at 233-34.
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upon the child and his development within the new home. Relinquish-
ment and termination of the rights of the natural parents are major
issues that must be confronted by adoptive parents. 5 While relinquish-
ment is a voluntary surrender of parental rights, termination is in-
voluntary and ordinarily requires a court order." Generally, the
underlying problems associated with the ending of the natural parents'
rights are the same whether the intermediary used for finding a child
is an agency or a private party. But the variance in the sequencing of
placement in private adoptions poses special concerns.
Regulated adoption agencies typically will not place a child until the
natural parents' rights have been completely relinquished or ter-
minated. In the case of relinquishment, an adoption agency often will
not place until the biological parents' relinquishment can no longer be
revoked. Additionally, under many statutory schemes if an adoption
agency placed the child, there may be no revocation period or it may
end six months after the relinquishment was signed." By contrast,
private placement occurs almost immediately after the child is born.
Thus, there can be a substantial period of time, while the child is
already in the adoptive home, in which the intermediary could be try-
ing, without success, to obtain relinquishment or termination.
Moreover, even if a relinquishment were obtained, there is a period of
time in which the relinquishment could still be revoked.8 The subtlety
mentioned above, whereby the statutory revocation period differs
depending upon whether the placement was through an agency or a
private party, exists because many states believe that the natural
mother needs greater protection in a private placement due to the lack
of counseling inherent in private placements. However, with man-
datory counseling, the revocation periods for both placement
mechanisms can be identical.
In light of these relinquishment and revocation problems, a major
complaint of the private placement system is the uncertainty that the
system promotes, for neither the adoptive parents nor the child, who is
adjusting to this new home, can be assured that the natural mother
and/or father will not seek to regain the child. Absent an agency to
provide foster care for the baby until all or most of the legal battles
are fought and won,8 this problem created by a truncated private
85. For an analysis of the problems with obtaining the relinquishment or termination
of parental rights and a 1977 national summary of the laws, see id at 149-64.
86. See generally Note, The Adoption Dilemma: The Divergence of Theory and
Practice, 38 BROOKLYN L. REv. 772, 776 (1972) [hereinafter cited as The Adoption Dilem-
ma].
87. ADOPTIONS WITHOUT AGENCIES, supra note 1, at 155-64.
88. See generally The Adoption Dilemma, supra note 86, at 779-782.
89. ADOPTIONS WITHOUT AGENCIES, supra note 1, at 30-31. However, even in an agen-
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placement is a constant risk in the independent adoption process.
Although the possibility that the placed child will have to be returned
to his natural parents appears to be a negative aspect of private place-
ment, it is more than offset by the psychological and emotional
benefits enjoyed by a child who has been placed almost immediately
after birth and was not exposed to foster care." Placing the child im-
mediately into his future home provides greater continuity and con-
sistency, which is most important to the psychological welfare of an in-
fant. ' In this regard, it should be noted that the agency dogma of
waiting until certain legal steps are completed before placement can
occur almost always causes a break in the child's continuity and con-
sistency of care; the normal delay experienced is anywhere from a few
months to a year. In the private placement scenario, however, continu-
ity and consistency of the child's home life is disrupted only in the
relatively rare case92 where legal complications arise. Accordingly,
since the focus is on the best interest of the child, the independent
adoption technique of immediate placement may be considered
superior to the agency plan of providing temporary foster care.
Adoptive parents are also concerned with two informational aspects:
first, they desire sufficient background information about the biological
parents, and second, they do not want either set of parents involved in
the adoption to know the identity of the other. It is important for the
adoptive parents to possess information about the biological parents so
that the adoptive parents will have full knowledge of the physical and
developmental factors that might affect the growth of the child.93 To
ensure that this information is gathered and available, the petition for
cy placement, where revocation is possible up to the time of the adoption decree, there is
some risk of a truncated placement. See id. at 155-60.
90. See id. at 143-48.
91. In re Adoption of a Child by P, and Wife, 114 N.J. Super. 584, 594, 277 A.2d 566,
571 (App. Div. 1971). The natural mother had knowingly and voluntarily relinquished her
rights to the child immediately after birth but changed her mind two months later when
it appeared possible to marry the child's natural father. The New Jersey Superior court
reasoned that although initially a natural parent has the right to custody, that right is
secondary to the concern of the state, as parens patriae, in promoting the child's welfare
and best interests. Id. at 591, 277 A.2d at 570. Relying upon the expert testimony of a
psychologist and a pediatrician, the court concluded that the child would experience
severe psychological trauma if she were to be separated from the custody of an adult with
whom she had developed an "affection-relationship." Under these circumstances, then,
psychological parenthood was deemed to outweigh biological parenthood. Although
neither set of parents was found obviously better than the other, the best interest of the
child required that the child be left with the prospective adoptive parents, rather than be
returned to her natural parents. Id. at 593-95, 277 A.2d at 571-72.
92. See ADOPTIONS WITHOUT AGENCIES, supra note 1, at 30-31; Foster, Adoption and
Child Custody: Best Interests of the Child, 22 BUFFALO L. REV. 1, 12 & n.37 (1972-73).
93. ADOPTIONS WITHOUT AGENCIES, supra note 1, at 132-34, 145-46, 224-25.
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adoption or an earlier report should require a complete recitation of
the facts deemed relevant to these concerns." Where confidentiality is
the issue, there is an attempt to control the natural parents' interven-
tion in the life of the child. Experts believe that for an adoption to be
successful, contact between the biological parents and the child must
be prevented. 5 A recent study showed that almost one-third of the
natural mothers in the independent adoptions surveyed knew the iden-
tity of the adoptive family; the same survey indicated that problems
with the natural parents contacting their biological child had been en-
countered. The only possible solution is statutorily to require that the
adoptive parents' identity be kept confidential when a child is placed
through any intermediary and to remove from the statutes any provi-
sions mandating that the identity of the biological and adoptive
parents be revealed to each other. 7
Finally, a concern is raised by those prospective adoptive parents
who cannot afford to adopt privately or who do not desire to adopt
privately. They fear that allowing independent adoptions to parallel
agency adoptions will lead to an unfair apportionment of the very
limited number of healthy white babies. Courts99 and commentators"
have already noted that those with the proper connections and suffi-
cient money can "jump to the head of the line" by avoiding the agen-
cies and can obtain through independent channels a child who could
have been placed with an agency family. To rebut this argument the
proponents of independent adoption point out that in any adoption the
best interests of the child are the primary concern, while fairness to
the adoptive couples is only a secondary matter. Furthermore, because
many biological parents would prefer placements through a private in-
termediary instead of an adoption agency, it would be inequitable to
force natural parents to utilize agency placement.
94. For a discussion of the information that should be available to the adoptive
parents see id at 100-01, 132-34.
95. Id at 7.
96. Id at 101-02.
97. See generally id. at 234.
98. See, e.g., In re Adoption of Child by N.P. and F.P., 165 N.J. Super. 591, 398 A.2d
937 (Union County Ct. 1979). The prospective adoptive parents were financially able to ob-
tain a child through unapproved intermediaries in violation of the New Jersey statute
which proscribed the use of certain intermediaries in adoptions. And although the court
recognized that the couple had used "their financial means to jump to the head of the line of
those couples waiting for a placement by an approved agency," the court nonetheless per-
mitted the adoption to occur since the adoptive parents were considered fit. The matter,
however, was referred to the county prosecutor for the imposition of possible criminal
sanctions. I& at 597, 398 A.2d at 940.
99. See generally Abolishing Baby Buying, supra note 36, at 548-49, 553-54.
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IV. CONCLUSION
The major arguments favoring independent adoption have already
been raised by way of counterargument in the preceeding sections.
Specifically, they include: the success rate for independent adoption is
as good as the success rate for agency adoption; the independent adop-
tion can be sufficiently controlled by uniform legislation to prevent
black-market activities; and the independent adoption, by placing the
child almost immediately after birth, guarantees continuity and con-
sistency of care. The few remaining arguments advanced by pro-
ponents of independent adoption are practical in nature and will now
be considered.
It is contended that the private and public agencies in most states
could not administratively handle the increased load if independent
adoptions were outlawed.0 0 The agencies already have long waiting
lists which often close for periods of time, although closing is usually
attributed to the shortage of healthy white babies. To some extent, it
was this very lack of available capacity which initially prompted
private channels to develop.' Another consideration, indirectly related
to the agencies' existing lack of capacity, is that the independent adop-
tion provides the only opportunity for individuals and couples who do
not fit within the narrow agency definition of what constitutes a pro-
per adopting individual or couple.' For example, most agencies have
minimum and maximum age requirements and will not consider a home
that already has two children; a substantial minority of agencies will
not place a second child in a home where there already is one child.'
Therefore, if the agencies cannot or will not place with certain people,
the independent adoption mechanism, if properly controlled, should be
allowed to function in concert with the agency process.
Although the arguments favoring or faulting the independent adop-
tion process are usually brought under the banner of the child, it ap-
pears that interests other than the child's are really being advocated.
During the actual private adoption process, the child is the silent part-
ner, or rather, silent victim, because under existing statutory schemes
there is truly no one representing his best interests. Later, when the
petition for adoption reaches the court, the judiciary becomes the
child's representative and assures his best interest. But the fact re-
mains that during the early stages of the independent adoption itself,
100. Black-Market Adoptions, supra note 6, at 56 & n.40.
101. Id. at 49 & n.6. See ADOPTIONS WITHOUT AGENCIES, supra note 1, at 35-36.
102. The Adoption Dilemma, supra note 86, at 774.
103. ADOPTIONS WITHOUT AGENCIES, supra note 1, at 37, 92. The medians for the
minimum and maximum age requirements reported were twenty-one and forty, respec-
tively. Id. at 37.
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primarily during placement, the child is no more than a silent partner.
Nonetheless, if the homeless child could voice his interests, he would
probably endorse the allowance of all avenues of placement, including
the continuation of private placement through the so-called gray
market. The child would urge this position because he would realize
that his paramount concern is to acquire a loving home by the most ex-
peditious means possible. The one caveat that the child would make
clear, however, is that the gray market be subjected to control
measures to insure that his best interest would be guaranteed.
This comment has raised the various concerns of those in the adop-
tion field, and admittedly, the burden of proof, or persuasion, has been
placed upon those who oppose independent adoptions. Imposition of
the burden was deemed appropriate because the private adoption pro-
cess has successfully existed for many years and is annually respon-
sible for a significant percentage of the children placed."' It seems
reasonable, then, to place the burden upon those urging change to
prove the faults of the system. But in light of the available evidence,
the burden has not been carried; at least analytically, there is no con-
clusive proof showing that independent adoptions are inferior to
agency adoptions."5 Moreover, many of the problem areas presently
associated with the private placement process can be eliminated by ef-
fective remedial legislation. Statutory controls, which embody most of
the recommendations set forth in this comment, have recently been
published for public scrutiny by the Department of Health, Education
and Welfare in the form of a Model State Adoption Act (MSAA). 1°8
Basically, MSAA permits private placements only if they are ac-
complished by the natural parents."7 As was discussed earlier in the
comment, this limitation imposed upon private placements is a fiction,
since even the most insignificant acts performed by the natural
parents can validate the actions of the intermediary.'08 Because MSAA
recognizes this fiction, most of MSAA's requirements and restrictions
are actually aimed at controlling the intermediary rather than the
natural parents. It would seem that this fiction should be avoided and
that the final version of MSAA should clearly allow private in-
termediaries to function apart from any fictional relationship with the
natural parents, albeit with stringent controls on their actions. Legal
fictions usually cause difficulties only for the "innocent" and tend to
obscure that which the law is actually trying to control.10 9
104. Approximately twenty percent of all placements are privately arranged. Id. at 10.
105. See notes 35-41 and accompanying text supra.
106. 42 U.S.C. § 511 2 (a) (Supp. II 1978); 45 Fed. Reg. 10,622 (1980).
107. 45 Fed. Reg. 10,659 (1980) (§ 203).
108. See notes 54-55 and accompanying text supra.
109. See generally Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977),
1
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The first major area of control is to require a meaningful investiga-
tion of the private placement either before or immediately after place-
ment. 10 Under MSAA, notice must be given to the court by the child's
natural parents within forty-eight hours of the placement. The notice is
in the nature of an informational report and is called the Notice of
Parental Placement."' Upon receipt of the Notice of Parental Place-
ment, the court must cause an agency to investigate the placement and
report to the court within thirty days; additionally, the court must
schedule a hearing to consider the proposed placement for adoption
within sixty days of the date of the Notice of Parental Placement. The
scope of the report required from the agency appears broad enough to
be equivalent to the investigation made by an agency when analyzing
the potential placement of an agency child." 2
110. See notes 43-45 and accompanying text supra.
111. 45 Fed. Reg. 10,662 (1980). Section 206(b) provides that "[t]he Notice of Parental
Placement shall be filed within forty-eight hours of the placement of the child with a per-
son who intends to adopt the child .... M A potential problem with the end of this
statutory provision - "person who intends to adopt the child" - is that a private place-
ment could be made and no Notice of Parental Placement would be compelled if there is
no intention to adopt. This language may allow placements without notice and unless the
child is actually being placed for temporary foster care, the child may grow up in legal
limbo. See notes 82-84 and accompanying text supra.
112. 45 Fed. Reg. 10,662 (1980). Section 206(c)(1) provides for agency action as follows:
(c) Upon receipt of a Notice of Parental Placement, the court shall:
(1) cause an agency to examine the child and conduct interviews with the birth
parents and prospective adoptive parents, and report to the court within thirty
days, but no sooner than five days after the birth of the child. The report must
state:
(A)(i) that, except as provided in subsection (ii) hereof, each of the parents or
alleged parents of the child as to whom there do not appear to be grounds for in-
voluntary termination of parental rights:
a. has been counseled and given a written statement regarding the possible
alternatives for future care of the child, including adoption; that assistance to ex-
plore such alternatives has been offered; and that, in a written statement, each
parent or alleged parent has either disclaimed an interest in the child or has
acknowledged his or her choice of adoption for the child and the reasons for that
choice;
b. knows of the intended placement and intends either to disclaim parenthood of
the child, to voluntarily terminate his parental rights with respect to the child with
full knowledge of the consequences, or to contest the proposed placement at the
hearing on the Notice of Parental Placement; and
c. has given a medical and social history which accompanies the report;
(ii) what efforts have been made to identify or interview any parent who is
unknown or cannot be located or who refuses to cooperate with the agency, and
any information regarding that parent which has been obtained;
(B) that a health assessment of the child including birth, neonatal, and other
medical history has been made; a copy of such assessment shall accompany the
report;
(C) that, as a result of the interview with the prospective adoptive parents, the
1980
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The second major area of control is to place a system of re-
quirements upon the private placement process to insure that black-
market profiteering will not occur.113 Although MSAA makes it clear
that an intermediary may not accept any consideration for procuring a
child on pain of fine and imprisonment, the model provision does allow
the adoptive parents to pay the actual medical expenses related to the
birth of the child."' This section appears too vague because it does not
specify the exact time during pregnancy when reimbursement for
medical expenses may begin. Moreover, the proposed statute places no
limit upon the amount of permissible reimbursement for medical costs.
Perhaps one solution would be for the provisions to state when costs
may start to be paid and then tie the maximum amount payable for
medical expenses to the fee permitted by a recognized insurer in the
state (such as Blue Cross-Blue Shield) for child birth and its attendant
potential complications. In any case, under MSAA the costs and fees
involved in the placement will have to be submitted by affidavit at the
placement hearing and the court may then question the parties to
determine whether all of the restrictions on costs and fees have been
met.1 15 As far as the problem with regulating fees paid to professionals
agency is convinced of the suitability of the prospective adoptive parents for the
child;
Id.
113. See notes 48-76 and accompanying text supra.
114. 45 Fed. Reg. 10,656 (1980). Sections 107(f) and (g), which control fees for indepen-
dent child placements, provide as follows:
(f) No person, agency, association, or corporation shall offer, give, request,
receive, or accept payment of cash or other consideration for the procurement of a
child for a prospective adoptive family, except that:
(1) reasonable fees for professional services may be charged for services provid-
ed with respect to the placement of a child pursuant to Section 205 of this Act;
(2) an agency, or the prospective adoptive parents of a child to be placed for
adoption pursuant to Section 206 of this Act, may pay the actual medical expenses
associated with the birth of the child to be placed for adoption.
(g) Any violation of subsection (f) of this Section 107 shall be punished by a fine
of no more than $20,000 or imprisonment of no longer than ten years, or both.
Id. It should be noted that § 206(e)(3)(B) of the MSAA will allow a placement to continue
at the court's discretion even if illegal costs or fees have been involved in the placement.
The court's decisison is to be based upon the best interest of child. 45 Fed. Reg. 10,663
(1980).
115. 45 Fed. Reg. 10,663 (1980). Section 206(e)(1) provides as follows:
At the hearing the court shall require that an itemized affidavit of costs and fees
regarding the placement be submitted by each parent, each prospective adoptive
parent, and each representative, if any, of birth parents or prospective adoptive
parents. On the basis of the agency report pursuant to subsection (c)(1) of this Sec-
tion 206 and the completed affidavits and, if necessary, an examination of the par-
ties, the court shall determine whether all requirements of law in arranging the
proposed placement for adoption have been met.
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other than "actual medical expenses," it appears that none will be per-
mitted in a private placement because impliedly these fees are only
allowed when an agency places a child."'6 Although the MSAA at-
tempts to address black-market activity, many of the black-market
problems raised by this comment, such as the veracity of the parties
when they are before the court and the enforcement of the criminal
provisions, are not addressed by MSAA because these problems are
arguably beyond the controls of a legislature. The issues concerning
the natural parents, which involve counseling and immediate alter-
native planning, are also addressed by the MSAA. Under the proposed
statute, agency involvement is required from the outset, and the agen-
cy must further insure that the natural parents have been counseled
and have been given a written statement regarding the possible alter-
natives for future care of their child.17
As previously discussed, an important objective of adoption legisla-
tion should be to protect the interests of the adoptive parents by in-
suring that they have sufficient information about the child's biological
background; equally important, however, is the need to preserve the
confidentiality of both the natural and adoptive parents' identities. As
to the first issue, the MSAA, within its provisions governing the scope
of the court-directed agency examination, requires that the agency in-
clude in its report a medical and social history of the natural parents
as well as an assessment and medical history of the child."' As to the
second issue, involving the confidentiality of the parties' identity, the
MSAA requires that the Notice of Parental Placement include the
name and address of each prospective parent, unless the placing
parent consents to the omission of the identity of the adoptive
parents."' Therefore, MSAA actually compels the parties to know each
other unless an intermediary agent is used and the placing parent con-
sents to the anonymity of the adoptive parents. As discussed in the
116. See note 114 supra for the content of § 107(f)(2). That section apparently restricts
the payment of reasonable fees for professional services to only § 205 placements, which
are placements through adoption agencies.
117. See note 112 supra for the text of the statutory provisions which control the
scope and timing of agency involvement in private placements.
118. IdL
119. 45 Fed. Reg. 10,662 (1980). Section 206(b) in pertinent part requires that the
following information be included in the Notice of Parental Placement:
(1) the name and address of each parent of the child, if known, and if unknown, the
reason therefor;
(2) the name and address of each prospective adoptive parent, unless the parent
making the placement has consented to omission of such name and address;
(3) the name and address, or expected date and place of birth, of the child; and
(4) the name and address of counsel, guardian ad litem, or other representative, if
any, for each of the aforementioned parties.
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body of this comment, in order to limit the possibility of later in-
terferences from the natural parents,2' the final version of MSAA
should be revised to provide that the identity of the adoptive parents
not be disclosed in a document available to the natural parents, unless
there is no intermediary agent involved in the placement.
With MSAA now published for comment, 21 each state has the ideal
vehicle to reconsider their present gray-market adoption controls. The
proposed model has been carefully and thoughtfully constructed by the
HEW panel. That the model is the result of careful deliberation is best
substantiated by MSAA's provision for the appointment, at the court's
discretion, of a guardian ad litem to represent the child at the hearing
on the Notice of Parental Placement.1 22
By permitting the independent adoption mechanism to exist legally,
the authors of MSAA have listened to the child's plea to legitimize
every available adoption vehicle in the United States which would ex-
peditiously place him into a loving home. Moreover, the child's recom-
mendation that gray market activity be effectively constrained to en-
sure the maintenance of his best interest has been fully accepted by
MSAA's authors who have constructed comprehensive controls to be
imposed upon the independent adoption process. But until there is
almost unanimous acceptance by the states of the proposed code, the
gray market will be either incompletely controlled or improvidently
outlawed, and the child will continue to be no more than a silent part-
ner in the determination of his future.
George William Myers, Jr.
120. See notes 93-97 and accompanying text supra.
121. 45 Fed. Reg. 10,622 (1980).
122. 45 Fed. Reg. 10,662 (1980) (§ 206(c)(2)).
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